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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





DISTRICT, School District No. 27,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant.
This matter is before the court on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 
Filing No. 19.1 This is an action for discrimination in employment. The plaintiff alleges that 
she was terminated from her position as a special education paraeducator by
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101 etseq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; and the Nebraska Age discrimination in 
Employment Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1001 et seq.
The defendant argues that uncontroverted facts show that the plaintiff cannot 
establish that she was disabled as that term was defined at the time she was terminated 
and that she has not presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination.
1Also pending is the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s brief in response to the motion as 
untimely, Filing No. 28 . The court finds that motion should be denied. There has been no showing of 
prejudice as a result of the late filing.
Papillion-La Vista School District (‘the School District”) in violation of the Americans with
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts
The parties agree on the following facts.2 The plaintiff, Patricia Hastings, was 
employed by the School District as a paraeducator at Papillion-LaVista High School 
(“PLHS”) since 2000. She was a one-on-one special education paraeducator for medically 
fragile students. Her job primarily involved working with students. At her annual physical 
in November of 2008, Hastings was given a temporary standing restriction. She then 
spoke to the human resources director, Ms. Mimi Goings, about it. Goings told Hastings 
that she could either transfer to another school or take sick leave until the restriction was 
lifted, but could not return to her job with the restriction. Hastings also told Goings at the 
meeting that she would need to take time off for doctor’s appointments in the future.
Hastings asked her doctor to lift the restriction the following day. Ms. Hastings 
presented PLHS with a second doctor’s note dated November 14, 2008, releasing her from 
her standing restriction. She missed only one day of work due to the standing restriction 
and returned to work in her job as a special education paraeducator at PLHS. Ms. Goings 
heard nothing more from Ms. Hastings or her doctor regarding her standing restriction or 
any health conditions or concerns after this.
The School District was aware that Ms. Hastings had been diagnosed with cancer 
in 2004 and 2006. She states that the School District “was excellent” in accommodating 
her while she was being treated for cancer. The plaintiff acknowledges that her employee
2These facts are gleaned from the parties’ respective statements of undisputed facts in their briefs 
in support of and opposition to the motion. See Filing No. 20, defendant's brief at 1-13; Filing No. 25 , p la intiff’s 
brief in opposition at 1-19.
2
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handbook mentions, and she was aware, that time off must be preapproved by an 
administrator.
In Ms. Goings’ position as Director of Human Resources, she received regular 
absence and leave reports regarding paraeducators. Ms. Goings expected to see Ms. 
Hastings’ name on these reports after their November communications in light of Ms. 
Hastings’ statement that she would need to miss work for doctor’s appointments. Ms. 
Goings asked Kathy Weaver, a special education teacher and head of the special 
education department at PLHS, whether Ms. Hastings had missed work, and Ms. Weaver 
stated that she had. Weaver then forwarded to Goings e-mails that Hastings had sent 
notifying the teachers of absences for three doctor’s appointments in November. Ms. 
Goings then compared Hastings’ November 2008 time sheet and discovered that she had 
marked down that she had worked full days each day that month except for two 
days— November 13, which was the day she missed because of her standing restriction, 
and November 14, a preapproved personal day. There was no indication on her time sheet 
that she had missed any time for her doctor’s appointments.
On December 10, 2008, Ms. Goings called a meeting with Principal Glover and Ms. 
Hastings to determine if Ms. Hastings had violated the district’s policies regarding leave 
time and time sheets. Ms. Hastings admitted that she had failed to record time that she 
was absent on her time sheets and that she did not get preapproval from an administrator 
before taking the time off. Ms. Goings terminated her employment for falsifying her time 
sheet, effective December 10, 2010. Ms. Weaver is not an administrator and does not 
have the authority to approve changes in hours for paraeducators. After Ms. Hastings’ 
termination, her position was filled by a forty-five-year-old.
3
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In opposition to the defendant’s motion, Hastings has presented evidence that 
shows that she had other medical conditions in addition to foot pain. Filing No. 21, Index 
of Evid., Ex. 1, Deposition of Patricia Hastings (“Hastings Dep.”) at 54, 62-63. She was 
treated for breast cancer in 2004 and for ovarian cancer in 2006. Id. at 107. There is 
evidence that other para-professionals with restrictions similar to Hastings’ standing 
restriction were accommodated at work. Id., Ex. 4, Deposition of James Glover (“Glover 
Dep.”) at 25. Principal Glover testified that he believed that Pat Hastings was playing a 
game and therefore did not deserve an accommodation. Id. at 27. Mimi Goings testified 
she had no idea of what other employees were doing or not doing with regard to the 
attendance policy at the high school at the time she and Hastings discussed the standing 
restriction. Id., Ex. 5, Deposition of Mimi Goings (“Goings Dep.”) at 22-23. Goings testified 
that she could not remember any para-professional employee being terminated for any 
reason other than not showing up for work. Id. at 64.
Elaine Hansen, the principal’s secretary, testified that Principal Glover was not strict 
with leave policies. Id., Ex. 2, Deposition of Elaine Hansen (“Hansen Dep.”) at 22-23. 
Kathy Weaver, a special education teacher and head of the department, testified that she 
was aware that the plaintiff had appointments and would come and go. Id., Ex. 3 (“Weaver 
Dep.”) at 25-26. Tammy Jean Grate, the school secretary, testified that employees were 
allowed to make up time that they missed in 2008. Id., Ex. 1, Deposition of Tammy Jean 
Grate (“Grate Dep.”) at 11-12. Grate kept track of absences and in 2008, Hastings would 
come in and sign out when she was going to an appointment. Id. at 21-22. It was Tammy 
Jean Grate's responsibility to check the time sheets at the end of the month when they 
were turned in and compare them to her calendar. Id. at 14-15. If there was a discrepancy
4
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in her examination of the calendar and the time sheets, she would take it to Elaine Hansen 
and Hansen would make the appropriate changes. Id. at 15-16.
Elaine Hansen, the principal’s secretary, was told that she had authority to allow 
people to take time off, but needed to know when the employees were going to make up 
their time by staying late or coming in early. Id., Hansen Dep. at 13. Pat Hastings came 
to Hansen on several occasions stating that she needed time off and Ms. Hansen, in Mr. 
Glover's absence, told her it was okay. Id. at 11.
Hastings testified that Kathy Weaver told her when she was undergoing cancer 
treatment in the past not to worry about taking time off for doctor’s appointments. Filing 
No. 21, Ex 1, Hastings Dep. at 19. Hastings testified that she made up the time by coming 
to work early in the mornings. Id. at 65. Kathy Weaver was not aware that the policy that 
employees could not make up time in that manner changed. Filing No. 26, Index of Evid., 
Ex. 3, Weaver Dep. at 26. To Elaine Hansen's recollection, Mr. Glover never disciplined 
anyone including Pat Hastings over the attendance policy. Id., Ex. 2, Hansen Dep. at 23. 
The hours of work for para-professionals varied depending on the para-professional and 
on the student. Id., Ex. 3, Weaver Dep at 17.
Kathy Weaver was aware that Pat Hastings was taking off time in the Fall of 2008. 
Id. at 20. Principal Glover was also aware that she had doctor’s appointments and was 
missing work. Id., Glover Dep. at 13. Weaver testified that in 2008 she was “under the 
impression that Pat’s cancer had returned and she was seeing a doctor and having tests 
done and doctor visits done to see if the cancer had returned.” Id., Ex. 3, Weaver Dep. at 
23. Mimi Goings was aware of that Pat Hastings was making up her missed time by 
showing up early in the morning. Id., Ex. 5, Goings Dep. at 54. Principal Glover stated that
5
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it had been a policy of his throughout his career as principal at the high school to permit 
employees to make up time that they had missed. Id., Ex. 4, Glover Dep. at 34.
B. Law
On a motion for summary judgment, the question before the court is whether the 
record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322, 
1326 (8th Cir. 1995). Where unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, 
summary judgment is particularly appropriate. Id. In ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, a court must not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. Kenney v. 
Swift Transp, Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 2003_.
The burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists is on the 
moving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 
(1970): Singletary v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
“[t]he moving party bears the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law”). Therefore, if the moving 
party does not meet its initial burden with respect to an issue, summary judgment must be 
denied notwithstanding the absence of opposing affidavits or other evidence. Adickes, 398 
U.S. at 159-60: Cambee's Furniture, Inc. v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 825 F.2d 167, 
173 (8th Cir. 1987). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may 
not rest on the allegations of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or 
other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Singletary, 423 F.3d 
at 89 .
6
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has “repeatedly emphasized that ‘summary 
judgment should be used sparingly in the context of employment discrimination and/or 
retaliation cases where direct evidence of intent is often difficult or impossible to obtain.’” 
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 605 F.3d 584, 593 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wallace v. DTG 
Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 2006)); see also Peterson v. Scott County, 
406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[s]ummary judgment should seldom be 
granted in employment discrimination cases because intent is often the central issue and 
claims are often based on inference”); Wheeler v. Aventis Pharm., 360 F.3d 853, 857 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (stating that “in employment discrimination cases, because intent is inevitably 
the central issue, we apply the [summary judgment] standard with caution.”); Breeding v. 
Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that “[s]ummary 
judgment seldom should be granted in discrimination cases where inferences are often the 
basis of the claim”); Bassett v. City of Minneapolis, 211 F.3d 1097 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
Although “summary judgment must be used with caution in discrimination cases due 
to the fact-specific nature of each case, it nonetheless may be proper ‘when a plaintiff fails 
to establish a factual dispute on an essential element of [the] case.’” Mershon v. St. Louis 
Univ., 442 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (2006) (quoting Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 
F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005)). No separate summary judgment standard exists for 
discrimination or retaliation cases and such cases are not immune from summary 
judgment. Wallace, 442 F.3d at 1118; Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 
1999) (“[T]here is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, 
and it remains a useful pretrial tool to determine whether or not any case, including one 
alleging discrimination, merits a trial.”).
7
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The ADEA protects individuals over forty and prohibits an employer from “fail[ing] 
or refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharging] any individual or otherwise discriminating] against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Generally speaking, 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of 
age discrimination with a showing that (1) he is over forty; (2) he was qualified for the 
position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly-situated 
employees outside the class were treated more favorably. Anderson v. Durham D & M, 
L.L.C., 606 F.3d 513, 523 (8th Cir. 2010). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
“frequently stated that the last prong of the prima facie case is established by 
demonstrating the plaintiff was replaced by a substantially younger individual.” Id.; see, 
e.g., McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 875-76 (8th Cir.2007); see also O'Connor 
v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1996) (prima facie case requires 
evidence adequate to create inference of discrimination, which cannot be drawn from the 
replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger). “To establish a 
disparate treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, . . . a plaintiff must prove 
that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer's adverse decision.” Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., — U.S. — , 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (finding the ADEA does 
not authorize a mixed motives age discrimination claim).
An employee can prove that “her employer's articulated justification for an adverse 
employment action is pretext ‘either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Jones v. National Amer. Univ., 608 F.3d
8
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1039, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Action, Inc., 521 F.3d 867, 872 (8th 
Cir.2008). Pretext may be shown with evidence that “the employer's reason for the 
[adverse employment decision] has changed substantially over time.” Loeb v. Best Buy 
Co., Inc., 537 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2008_.
To show that one is disabled under federal law, an individual must show that she: 
(1) has a physical, sensory, or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having 
such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). Under the “regarded as” prong, a 
person may be disabled under the ADA if, notwithstanding the absence of an actual 
disability, he is perceived or “regarded as” having an impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1999). Under the 
ADA, "the ‘regarded as' provision was established to combat ‘archaic attitudes, erroneous 
perceptions, and myths' working to the disadvantage of the disabled or perceived 
disabled." Wisbey v. City of Lincoln, 612 F.3d 667, 672-73 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brunko 
v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001)).
Working has been recognized as a major life activity. See Breitkreutz v. Cambrex 
Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2006): Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., 432 
F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2005); Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834-35 (8th Cir. 
2001): Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Amer., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 949 (8th Cir. 1999). “‘In order 
to be regarded as disabled with respect to the major life activity of working, the employer 
must mistakenly believe that [an] actual impairment substantially limits the employee's 
ability to work.’” Wisbey, 612 F.3d at 672 (quoting Chalfant v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 475 
F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2007)). A substantial limitation on the major life activity of working
9
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means that an individual must be “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a 
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average 
person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I). The 
test is whether the defendant treated an employee adversely because it regarded the 
employee as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. 
Weber, 186 F.3d at 915: Kellogg, 233 F.3d at 1089.
Under the law in effect at the time of the plaintiff's termination, the terms “major life 
activities” and “substantial limitation” were interpreted strictly to create a demanding 
standard for qualifying as disabled.3 Toyota MotorMfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 
197 (2002) (abrogated by statute in Pub. L. 110-325 (2008)); accord Ristrom v. Asbestos 
Workers Local 34 Joint Apprentice Comm., 370 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2004). Courts were 
to consider the nature, severity, duration, and long-term impact of the impairment when 
deciding whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Wood v. Crown 
Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685 (2003). The impairment also had to be of an extended 
or permanent duration. Williams, 534 U.S. at 19_.
3The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) became effective January 1,2009. See Pub. L. No. 
110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 note). The ADAAA amends the ADA in 
important respects, particularly with regard to the definition and construction of “disability” under the statute. 
The ADAAA broadens the definition of disability and rejects the strict standards that the Supreme Court 
adopted in Williams, 534 U.S. at 197. Also, although the general definition of “disability” retains largely the 
same language, the ADAAA adds a provision that addresses the intended scope of the “regarded as” prong 
of that definition. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A_) 
(specifying that “ [a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment' if the 
individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an 
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit 
a m ajor life activity”); see also Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)) (“[The ‘regarded as' prong of 
§ 12102(1) ] shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an 
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”). Because the plaintiff was terminated 
prior to January 1,2009, the ADAAA does not apply to her. Nyrop v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 11, 616 F.3d 
728, 734 (8th Cir. 20101
10
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II. DISCUSSION
The evidence presented in support of and against the defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment shows genuine issues of material fact exist in this case. Resolution of 
the issues will involve credibility assessments. With respect to the age discrimination 
claim, the plaintiff has shown that she was replaced by a younger individual and was 
singled out for discipline when other individuals were not. These circumstances create an 
inference of age discrimination. Determinations of motive, intent, and credibility are 
questions for a jury.
Although her foot pain may not qualify as an ADA qualifying disability, there is a 
genuine issue of fact with respect to whether Hastings was regarded as having a disabling 
impairment. The ADAAA, if applicable, would provide additional support for the plaintiff’s 
claims in this case, but even under pre-ADAAA case law, the plaintiff has provided 
sufficient evidence that she was perceived as disabled under the ADA to survive summary 
judgment. The plaintiff has shown that the school district knew she had twice been 
diagnosed with cancer earlier and it had accommodated her need for time off for doctor’s 
appointments and treatments. She testified that it was only after she submitted a doctor’s 
note regarding a standing restriction and told the Human Resources Director that she 
would need additional time off for appointments that her time sheets were investigated. 
Importantly, having been treated for cancer in the past, Hastings testified that she told Ms. 
Goings at the time she presented the doctor's note that she would need to take time off for 
additional appointments in the future. Evidence suggests that school district employees 
knew or suspected that she was being treated for a recurrence of cancer. There is 
evidence that the school district’s leave policies were not uniformly enforced and that
11
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others were treated differently for similar conduct. A reasonable juror could infer from this 
evidence that the employer perceived the plaintiff as having an impairment that 
substantially interfered with the major life activity of working. Further, a reasonable juror 
could conclude, depending on assessments of credibility, that the defendant’s proffered 
reason for the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext for discrimination.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant has 
not shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the disability or age 
discrimination claims. There are issues of fact with respect to whether the School District’s 
articulated reason for the plaintiff’s termination was a pretext for either age or disability 
discrimination. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s brief (Filing No. 28) is denied.
2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 19) is denied.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Joseph F. Bataillon___________
Chief United States District Judge
*This opinion may contain hyperlinks to other documents or W eb sites. The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Nebraska does not endorse, recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services 
or products they provide on their W eb sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third 
parties or their W eb sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any 
hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect 
the opinion of the court.
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